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Rethinking Non-Failure-to-Warn Claims Against Generic Drug Manufacturers: An Argument for 
the Supreme Court to Reverse Bartlett v. Mutual Pharmaceutical 
 
Jonathan A. Keller

 
I. Introduction 
The United States Constitution instituted the concept of federalism, a system of dual 
sovereignty between the federal and state governments.
1
  Such a system sometimes positions 
state power against federal power, but other times allows for concurrent authority.
2
  The 
Supremacy Clause of the Constitution resolves conflicts between federal and state law by 
providing that federal law “shall be the supreme Law of the Land.”3  In any preemption case, the 
critical question is always whether the relevant state and federal laws, either explicitly or 
implicitly, conflict―oftentimes a complex and difficult question to answer.4  In the last few 
years, the Supreme Court has dealt with the issue of preemption regarding the laws regulating 
prescription pharmaceuticals,
5
 catapulting product liability actions against drug manufacturers to 
the forefront of the debate over the role of federal regulation of prescription drugs.
6
 
In 2009, the Supreme Court first addressed the preemption issue as it applied to the laws 
regulating brand-name drug manufacturers.  In Wyeth v. Levine,
7
 the Court held that state law 
failure-to-warn claims were neither explicitly nor impliedly preempted by the federal laws 
governing prescription drug labeling.
8
  The Court conducted a detailed analysis of the Food, 
                                                          

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University, Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy.  Immense thanks to Professor Jordan K. Paradise for her tremendous 
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1
 THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (James Madison). 
2
 Id. 
3
 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
4
 Roger Pilon, Into the Preemption Thicket Again-Five Times!, 2011 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 263, 264 (2011). 
5
 See Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555 (2009); PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. 2567 (2011). 
6
 Mary J. Davis, The Battle over Implied Preemption: Products Liability and the FDA, 48 B.C. L. REV. 1089, 1090 
(2007). 
7
 555 U.S. 555 (2009). 
8
 Id. at 555. 
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Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA), a federal law, and concluded that it afforded brand-name 
manufacturers a way to comply with both their state law duty to strengthen the drug’s labeling 
and with federal regulations.
9
   
Then, only two years later in 2011, the Supreme Court came to a seemingly opposite 
result in its application of preemption to the laws regulating generic drug manufactures.  In 
PLIVA v. Mensing,
10
 the Court ruled that state law failure-to-warn clams against generic 
manufacturers were implicitly preempted by federal law based on a close reading of the FDCA.
11
  
In reaching its decision, the Court recognized that generic manufacturers are prohibited by 
statute from unilaterally changing their product labeling without prior Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA) approval.
12
  Unlike brand-name manufacturers, generic manufacturers do 
not have the same regulatory mechanisms
13
 to account for new safety information and would 
violate federal law if they unilaterally change their warning labels.
14
   
The Supreme Court’s decisions in Wyeth and Mensing have provided critical guidance 
illustrating how the preemption analysis should be applied to the laws regulating brand-name and 
generic drug manufacturers in the context of failure-to-warn claims.  But, these two cases left 
unanswered the preemption question with respect to non-failure-to-warn claims against generic 
manufacturers.
15
  The federal district courts have struggled with this issue, but with near 
                                                          
9
 Id. at 556–73. 
10
 131 S. Ct. 2567 (2011). 
11
 Id. at 2571. 
12
 Id. at 2574–75 (“The FDA, however, tells us that it interprets its regulations to require that the warning labels of a 
brand-name drug and its generic copy must always be the same—thus, generic drug manufacturers have an ongoing 
federal duty of ‘sameness.’”); see also 57 Fed. Reg. 17961 (1992) (“[T]he [generic drug’s] labeling must be the 
same as the listed drug product’s labeling because the listed drug product is the basis for [generic drug] approval.”). 
13
 See also 21 C.F.R. §§ 314.70(c)(3)–(6) (The FDA’s changes-being-effected process allows brand-name 
manufacturers to add or strengthen warnings and label instructions to increase the safe use of the drug.  Brand-name 
manufacturers do not need to wait for FDA preapproval when making labeling changes through the CBE process; 
rather, they only need to file a supplemental application with the FDA.  But, that process allows generic 
manufacturers to change its labels only when the brand label is concurrently changed). 
14
 Mensing, 131 S. Ct. at 2578–79 (2011).   
15
 See Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555 (2009); Mensing, 131 S. Ct. 2567.  
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unanimity they have adopted a broad reading of Mensing based on its holding and reasoning.
 16
  
Specifically, the district courts have concluded that the rationales enunciated in Mensing, which 
preempted state failure-to-warn claims, apply with equal force to, and thus also preempt, state 
design defect claims against generic manufacturers.
17
    
In May 2012, however, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit broke 
ranks with every federal district court by upholding a district court’s decision to allow a design 
                                                          
16
 See In re Pamidronate Products Liab. Litig., 842 F. Supp. 2d 479 (E.D.N.Y. 2012) (State law claims challenging 
the adequacy of generic drug labeling are preempted.  Design defect claims are preempted because the “sameness” 
requirement in the labeling context applies equally to generic manufacturers with regards to the design of the drug.  
Negligent testing and breach of express warranty claims are warning claims in disguise and are preempted.  Implied 
warranty claims are design defect claims in disguise and are preempted); In re Fosamax (Alendronate Sodium) 
Products Liab. Litig. (No. II), No. 08–008 (GEB–LHG), 2011 WL 5903623 (D.N.J. Nov. 21, 2011) (The design of a 
generic drug, like its warnings, must be the same as the brand-name reference drug; therefore, design defect claims 
and negligent design claims are preempted.  Negligence claims relating to generic drug warnings are preempted.  
Express warranty, fraud, misrepresentation, and consumer protection claims all attack a drug’s labeling and are thus 
preempted); Gross v. Pfizer, Inc., 825 F. Supp. 2d 654 (D. Md. 2011) (Negligence claims alleging that generic 
manufacturers had a duty to cease selling their product at all are preempted.  Such a claim would directly conflict 
with FDA authority to determine what drugs can be sold in interstate commerce.  Claims for concealing information 
from FDA are warning claims, and are preempted.  Claims alleging failure to update do not exist at state law, and in 
any event are preempted); Cooper v. Wyeth, Inc., No. 09-929-JJB, 2012 WL 733846 (M.D. La. Mar. 6, 2012) 
(Claims of inadequate post-marketing surveillance of drug’s adverse effects are preempted.  Claims that generic 
manufacturers had a duty to withdrawal its product from the market are preempted.  The fact that defendant’s 
generic product has been designated a reference listed drug does not establish that it may unilaterally change its 
warnings.  Express warranty claims based on labeling are preempted.  Design defect claims are not seen as really 
challenging the design of the drug, but rather only the warnings, and thus are preempted); Johnson v. Teva 
Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc., No. 2:10 CV 404, 2012 WL 1866839 (W.D. La. May 21, 2012) (All warning claims 
preempted.  Claims of failure to use additional forms of communication to provide warnings are 
preempted.  Express warranty and design defect claim asserting an alternative package design are really warning 
claims in disguise and are preempted.  Design defect claims challenging the composition of the drug itself are 
preempted because prior FDA approval is required to change it.  A claim that the drug should have been removed 
from the market is preempted); In re Darvocet, Darvon & Propoxyphene Products Liab. Litig., No. 2:11–MD–2226–
DCR, 2012 WL 718618 (E.D. Ky. Mar. 5, 2012) (Marketing claims that generic manufacturers had a state duty to 
withdrawal its product from the market are preempted.  Both design and warning claims are preempted since the 
“sameness” obligation applies to the design as well as to the warning requirement for generic drugs.  Consumer 
fraud and express warranty claims all seek to change the label, and are preempted.  Claims based on alleged 
violations of the FDCA are preempted as improper private rights of action); Fulgenzi v. PLIVA, Inc., No. 
5:09CV1767, 2012 WL 1110009 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 31, 2012) (State law claims challenging the adequacy of generic 
drug labeling are preempted.  All non-failure-to-warn claims were inadequately pleaded, but even if they were, 
design defect claims would be preempted under the statute’s “sameness” requirement.  Claims for breach of express 
and implied warranties, misrepresentation, breach of undertaking, fraud, constructive fraud, fraudulent concealment, 
and intentional infliction of emotional distress all assert warning claims and are preempted.  A claim that the drug 
should have been removed from the market is preempted). 
17
 See In re Pamidronate, 842 F. Supp. 2d 479; In re Fosamax, 2011 WL 5903623; In re Darvocet, 2012 WL 
718618. 
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defect claim against a generic manufacturer.
18
  In Bartlett v. Mutual Pharmaceutical, the First 
Circuit rejected the generic manufacturer’s argument that, just as in the labeling context in 
Mensing, design defect claims against generic manufacturers are preempted since a generic 
manufacturer cannot unilaterally alter the composition of is drugs.
19
  Rather, the First Circuit 
found that there was no conflict between the federal and state law, and thus the design defect 
claim was not preempted.
20
 
The First Circuit erred in Bartlett because it openly departed from the Supreme Court’s 
reasoning in Mensing, which explained that because of a generic manufacturers’ “ongoing 
federal duty of sameness,” they are prevented from deviating in any material respect from their 
brand-name equivalents.
21
  Had the First Circuit faithfully applied the holding and reasoning in 
Mensing, it would have concluded that because the “impossibility” of changing a generic drug’s 
labeling under federal law led to the preemption of failure-to-warn claims, then the 
“impossibility” of changing a drug’s chemical composition under federal law would have also 
led to the preemption of design defect claims.
22
  Recognizing this tension between Bartlett and 
the Court’s prior decision in Mensing, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to review Bartlett 
and definitively answer whether non-failure-to-warn claims against generic manufacturers are 
preempted.
23
   
This Comment will focus on the viability of state law design defect claims against 
generic drug manufacturers, arguing that federal law preempts such claims.  Part II of this 
Comment will begin by detailing the regulatory scheme under the FDCA, placing the preemption 
                                                          
18
 Bartlett v. Mut. Pharm. Co., Inc., 678 F.3d 30 (1st Cir. 2012). 
19
 Id. at 37–38. 
20
 Id. at 37 (Court explained that because there was no federal law requiring Mutual to sell its generic drug, then a 
state law requiring Mutual to withdrawal the drug from the market would not conflict with federal requirements.  
Thus, the court concluded it was not impossible for Mutual to comply with both federal and state law).   
21
 Mensing, 131 S. Ct. at 2574–75. 
22
 See infra Part V. 
23
 Mut. Pharm. Co., Inc. v. Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. 694 (2012). 
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issue in context.
24
  In doing so, the FDCA and FDA regulations concerning drug manufacturers’ 
ability to change their product labeling and composition post market will be examined and 
contrasted to the corresponding state law.  Part III will discuss three product liability actions that 
an individual may bring against a drug manufacturer.
25
   This part will specifically address the 
issues that arise when design defect claims are brought against drug manufacturers.  Part IV will 
begin by setting forth the different types of preemption.
 26
  Then, it will examine Wyeth v. Levine 
and PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, the two high-profile Supreme Court cases that have addressed the 
issue of preemption with regards to prescription drugs.  Part IV will then continue with an 
analysis of how courts have applied preemption in the wake of Mensing, with a particular focus 
on design defect claims.  Part IV will conclude with an examination of the First Circuit’s 
decision Bartlett v. Mut. Pharm. Co., Inc. and argue that the court erred by failing to hold that a 
design defect claim against the generic manufacturer was preempted.
27
  Part V sets forth several 
reasons why the Supreme Court is likely to reverse Bartlett, and suggests that all design defect 
claims against generic drug manufacturers should be preempted.
28
   
Part II: The Prescription Drug Regulatory Framework 
 The FDCA regulates the sale and labeling of all prescription drugs in the United States.
29
  
A new prescription drug
30
 cannot be sold in the United States without the FDA’s prior 
approval.
31
  When the sponsor
32
 of a new drug has gathered enough evidence regarding the 
drug’s safety and efficacy, the sponsor then submits a New Drug Application (NDA) to the FDA.  
                                                          
24
 See infra notes 29–64 and accompanying text. 
25
 See infra notes 65–99 and accompanying text. 
26
 See infra notes 100–158 and accompanying text. 
27
 See infra notes 159–211 and accompanying text. 
28
 See infra notes 212–251 and accompanying text. 
29
 Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 301–399 (2006). 
30
 21 U.S.C. § 321(p) (2009).  A new drug is one that is not yet recognized as safe and effective to treat a particular 
medical condition.  Id. 
31
 21 U.S.C. § 355(a). 
32
 Often a brand-name drug manufacturer. 
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The purpose of the NDA is to provide the FDA with enough information to allow the agency to 
determine whether the drug is safe and effective for its proposed use.
33
    
An Abbreviated New Drug Application (ANDA) contains data that, when submitted to 
the FDA, provides for the review and approval of a generic drug.
34
  Generic drug applications are 
termed an “abbreviated” process because those manufacturers are generally not required to 
include clinical data from test studies establishing the drug’s safety and efficacy.  Once 
approved, the applicant may then manufacture and market the generic drug product.
35
   
A. New Drugs 
In order to market a new prescription drug, the sponsor must submit a NDA, 
accompanied by extensive clinical and scientific studies verifying the drug’s safety and efficacy 
profile.
36
  The NDA includes, among other disclosures, the safety and efficacy reports from the 
clinical trials, a list of all the components and composition of the drug, a description of the 
methods and controls used in manufacturing, processing, and packaging the drug, samples of the 
drug, and examples of intended labeling.
37
  The FDA may deny the approval of a drug if it finds 
that the labeling is insufficient.
38
    
The brand-name manufacturer’s obligations continue after the FDA approves the drug. 
The manufacturers must maintain records, conduct additional testing as directed, and advise the 
FDA of significant adverse health consequences that are discovered following the drug’s 
introduction to the market.
39
  Further, when new information about the safety of a drug becomes 
apparent to the sponsor, the brand-name manufacturer has an obligation to update its label to 
                                                          
33
 21 U.S.C. § 355(b). 
34
 Id. 
35
 21 C.F.R. § 314.50. 
36
 21 U.S.C. §§ 355(a)–(i). 
37
 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1). 
38
 21 U.S.C. § 355(c). 
39
 21 U.S.C. § 355(k)(1); 21 C.F.R. § 314.80. 
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reflect such warnings.
40
  If the labeling change is “major,”41 the manufacturer must obtain FDA 
approval prior to implementing the change.
42
  On the other hand, “moderate [labeling] 
changes,”43 may be implemented by the brand-name manufacturer before the FDA formally 
approves the proposed change.
44
  Moderate labeling changes are implemented through the 
Changes Being Effected (CBE) procedure.
45
 
The Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 2007 (FDAAA)
46
 amended the 
FDCA and gave the FDA additional tools to regulate prescription drugs.
47
  The FDAAA added 
section 505(o) to the FDCA which authorizes the FDA to mandate additional post marketing 
studies and clinical trials for prescription drugs.
48
  It also authorizes the FDA, under certain 
circumstances, to require a manufacturer to submit risk evaluation and mitigation strategies 
(REMS) to ensure that the drug’s benefits continue to outweigh its risks.49  Lastly, the 
amendment gave the FDA the authority to require drug manufacturers to implement safety-
related labeling changes (SLC).
50
 
B. Generic Drugs 
In 1984 Congress passed the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act, 
(commonly referred to as the “Hatch-Waxman Act”), to reduce the cost and increase the speed of 
                                                          
40
 21 C.F.R. § 201.80(e). 
41
 21 C.F.R. § 314.70(b) (Major changes would include any alteration in the drug’s substance or production process 
which could adversely affect the identity, strength, purity, or potency of the drug, or a major label change).   
42
 21 C.F.R. § 314.70(b). 
43
 21 C.F.R. § 314.70(c) (Moderate changes would include alterations to the drug substance or production process 
with a moderate possibility of adversely affecting the identity, strength, purity, or potency of a drug relating to safety 
or effectiveness and many label changes, such as strengthening warnings, deleting misleading or unsupported 
indications for use, or strengthening dosage or administration instructions). 
44
 21 C.F.R. §§ 314.70(c)(3), (6)(iii)(A)–(D). 
45
 21 C.F.R. §314.70(c)(6)(iii). 
46
 Pub. L. No. 110-85, 121 Stat. 823 (2007). 
47
 Pub. L. No. 110-85, 121 Stat. 823 (2007). 
48
 21 U.S.C. § 355(o)(3). 
49
 21 U.S.C. § 355-1. 
50
 21 U.S.C. §§ 355(o), 355–1(g), 333(f). 
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the approval of generic drugs.
51
  The Hatch-Waxman Act established the ANDA, an abridged 
process through which generic versions of brand-name drugs can be approved.
52
  Unlike brand-
name sponsors, which must submit data from clinical trials demonstrating the safety and efficacy 
of their drug, the generic sponsor can “piggyback” on the information the brand-name sponsor 
already provided to the FDA.
53
  The generic sponsor need only establish that its generic product 
is the same as the brand-name drug.
54
  
The primary difference between a NDA and an ANDA is that the latter generally does 
not require the extensive, and very expensive, pre-clinical and clinical studies that are the basis 
for establishing the drug’s safety and efficacy profile in the NDA process.55  Under the ANDA 
process, the FDA will approve a generic drug for marketing upon proof that the drug is identical 
in active ingredient(s), dosage form, strength, route of admission, has the same labeling, and is 
bioequivalent to the brand-name drug.
56
  In other words, the ANDA process focuses on 
establishing that the new generic drug is a copy of the brand-name drug in every significant 
respect, including its bioequivalence to the already approved brand-name drug.
57
   A generic 
drug is considered bioequivalent to the brand-name drug when there is no significant difference 
in the rate and extent in which the drug becomes available in the body.
58
  In particular, the FDA 
will determine whether the generic drug delivers the active ingredient(s) into the patients’ 
                                                          
51
 Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984). 
52
 Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984). 
53
 21 C.F.R. § 355(j)(2)(A). 
54
 Purepac Pharm. Co. v. FDA, 354 F.3d 877, 879 (D.C. Cir. 2004); 21 C.F.R. § 355(j)(2)(A). 
55
 21 C.F.R. §314.94 (laying out the content and format of the ANDA). 
56
 21 C.F.R. §314.92(a)(1); 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A). 
57
 21 C.F.R. §314.92(a)(1); 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A). 
58
 21 C.F.R. § 320.1(e); see also Colacicco v. Apotex, Inc., 432 F. Supp. 2d 514, 523 (E.D. Pa. 2006), aff'd, 521 F.3d 
253 (3d Cir. 2008), vacated, 129 S. Ct. 1578 (2009) (noting that “[t]he ANDA applicant need only certify that the 
generic manufacturer will produce a bio-equivalent of the brand name drug and that the labeling and warnings of the 
generic drug are identical to that of the approved innovator drug”). 
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bloodstream in the same quantities and at the same rate when administered under similar 
conditions as the name-brand drug.
59
   
Furthermore, the generic sponsor must show that, with certain exceptions,
60
 the labeling 
of the generic drug is the same as the brand-name drug’s labeling.61  If the brand-name 
manufacturer makes a labeling change to its drug, the generic manufacturer must mirror that 
change in its corresponding drug labeling.
62
   If the brand-name manufacturer does not make a 
labeling change, however, the generic manufacturer may not unilaterally change its drug 
labeling.
63
 In fact, the FDA’s approval of an ANDA may be withdrawn if the labeling for the 
generic drug is no longer consistent with that of the brand-name drug referred to in the ANDA.
64
   
Part III: The Three Types of Product Defects 
Product liability suits involving prescription drugs are state tort actions.
65
  Under strict 
products liability theory, a manufacturer may be held liable via three distinct types of product 
defects: manufacturing defects, warning defects (as known as failure-to-warn claims), and design 
defects.
66
   
A. Manufacturing Defect Claim 
A manufacturing defect is an unintended flaw in the product from the result of improper 
manufacturing.
67
  Typically, the plaintiff will allege that the product ultimately produced was 
                                                          
59
 See 21 C.F.R. § 314.94(a)(7). 
60
 21 C.F.R. § 314.94(a)(8)(iv).  It identifies the following differences as acceptable: “[D]ifferences in expiration 
date, formulation, bioavailability, or pharmacokinetics, labeling revisions made to comply with current FDA 
labeling guidelines or other guidance, or omission of an indication or other aspect of labeling protected by patent or 
accorded exclusivity under section 505(j)(4)(D) of the act.” 
61
 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(v); 21 C.F.R. § 314.94(a)(8)(iii). 
62
 See FDA, Guidance for Industry, Revising ANDA Labeling Following Revision of the RLD Labeling (May 2000) 
(ANDA Labeling Revision Guidance). 
63
 57 Fed. Reg. 17961 (1992); see also PLIVA , Inc. v. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. 2567, 2581–82 (2011). 
64
 21 C.F.R. § 314.150(b)(10). 
65
 MARK HERRMANN & DAVID B. ALDEN, DRUG AND DEVICE PRODUCT LIABILITY LITIGATION STRATEGY 39 (2012). 
66
 Id. 
67
 Id. at 53. 
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different from what the manufacturer intended.
68
  In assessing whether a manufacturing defect 
exists, the law focuses on whether the product was made in accordance with the manufacturer’s 
own standards.
69
  If the product is not in its “intended condition,” it is defective and the 
manufacturer faces strict liability for injuries caused by the manufacturing defect.
70
  There is 
generally no controversy over manufacturing defect law for prescription drugs.
71
  
B. Failure-to-Warn Claim 
A failure-to-warn defect exists when the manufacturer fails to provide adequate warnings 
regarding the risks associated with using the product.
 72
  The Restatement (Second) of Torts 
explains that while some prescription drugs may be unavoidably unsafe, they are not 
“unreasonably dangerous” when “accompanied by proper directions and warnings.”73  When 
alleging a failure-to-warn, a plaintiff need only show that the manufacturer knew or should have 
known that use of the product carried risks which the manufacturer failed to warn the plaintiff 
against.
74
   
In failure-to-claims against drug manufacturers, the issue centers on the drug’s labeling 
and whether the warning was adequate.
75
   It is via the drug’s labeling in which the manufacturer 
typically discloses the warnings regarding the drug.
76
  The Supreme Court addressed whether 
failure-to-warn claims are preempted against drug manufacturers in Wyeth
77
 and Mensing.
78
  
Wyeth held that failure-to-warn claims are not preempted against brand-name manufacturers 
                                                          
68
 Id. 
69
 See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965). 
70
 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A(2)(a) (1965). 
71
 Grundberg v. Upjohn Co., 813 P.2d 89, 92 (Utah 1991) (explaining that this limitation on comment k immunity is 
universally recognized).   
72
 W. PAGE KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS, 697 (5th ed. 1984). 
73
 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. k (1965). 
74
 W. PAGE KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS, 697 (5th ed. 1984). 
75
 See Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 563 (2009). 
76
 Id. at 562. 
77
 555 U.S. 555 (2009). 
78
 131 S. Ct. 2567 (2011). 
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while Mensing explained such claims are preempted against generic manufacturers.
79
  They left 
unanswered, however, the question of preemption as it applies to non-failure-to-warn claims 
against generic manufacturers.
80
  Accordingly, since Mensing was decided, trial courts across the 
country have grappled with that unsolved issue and have had to interpret the breadth and scope 
of the Court’s decision.   
C. Design Defect Claims 
A design defect exists when the product is otherwise manufactured properly, but is 
nonetheless unreasonably dangerous because of its inherent design.
81
  Alleging a design defect 
claim depends heavily on whether the state it is brought under adheres to the Second or Third 
Restatement of Torts, and how that state specifically interprets the Restatement.   
With respect to design defect claims for prescription drugs, comment k to section 402(A) 
of Restatement (Second) of Torts provides that a prescription drug, “properly prepared, and 
accompanied by proper directions and warning, is not defective, nor is it unreasonably 
dangerous.”82  Additionally, the seller of such a product will not be held strictly liable for the 
“unfortunate consequences” that may arise from its use “merely because [the manufacturer] has 
undertaken to supply the public with an apparently useful and desirable product, attended with a 
known but apparently reasonable risk.”83  In a claim alleging the defective design of a 
prescription drug, comment k allows the manufacturer to escape strict liability if the risks 
associated with the prescription drug were unavoidable.
84 
 Once falling under comment k’s 
                                                          
79
 Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 555; PLIVA v. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. 2567, 2567 (2011). 
80
 See, Wyeth, 555 U.S. 555; Mensing, 131 S. Ct. 2567. 
81
 HERRMANN, supra note 65, at 46.    
82
 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, cmt. k (1965) (emphasis added). 
83
 Id. 
84
 E.g. Brochu v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 642 F.2d 652, 657 (1st Cir. 1981) (explaining the protections from strict 
liability afforded by comment k). 
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protection, the prescription drug manufacturer is not held strictly liable on the basis of a 
defective design.
85
 
On its face, comment k would appear to preclude strict liability against design defect 
claims for prescription drugs that are properly manufactured and accompanied by appropriate 
warnings.  In practice, however, the states have applied comment k in divergent ways,
86
 leading 
to confusion as manufacturers face different standards depending on the jurisdiction.
87
  
Regardless of the approach taken, however, the comment k defense will not apply, and the 
manufacturer may be held strictly liable, if the drug was defectively manufactured or lacked 
adequate warnings.
88
   
                                                          
85
 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, cmt. b (1965).   
86
 Courts confronted with claims of defectively designed drugs have generally adopted comment k, but have 
disagreed on the scope of protection that comment k affords prescription drugs.  See Brown v. Superior Court 
(Abbott Labs), 751 P.2d 470, 476 (Cal. 1988).  Most courts apply comment k’s protection from strict liability in a 
selective fashion, excepting from strict liability manufacturers of prescription drugs on a case-by-case basis.  Id.    
However, a sizeable minority of courts apply comment k’s protections to all manufacturers of prescription drugs, 
excepting the manufacturers from strict liability on the basis of a defective design.  E.g., Lindsay v. Ortho Pharm. 
Corp., 637 F.2d 87, 90 (2d Cir. 1980); Grundlerberg V. Upjohn Co. 813 P.2d 89 (Utah 1991).   
87
 See e.g., Grinage v. Mylan Pharms., Inc., 840 F. Supp. 2d 862 (D. Md. 2011); Gross v. Pfizer, Inc., 825 F. Supp. 
2d 654, 659 (D. Md. 2011).  In Pennsylvania, comment k bars strict liability failure-to-warn, manufacturing defect, 
and design defect claims for prescription drugs.  Lance v. Wyeth, 4 A.3d 160, 165, 166 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2010) (“With 
our Supreme Court’s adoption of comment k, a design defect claim for strict liability is not cognizable under 
Pennsylvania law when it is asserted against a manufacturer of prescription drugs,” but the plaintiff’s “negligent 
design claim [wa]s not precluded by comment k, and [wa]s a valid cause of action upon which relief may be 
granted.”).  In Washington, comment k bars strict liability only to design defect and failure-to-warn claims for 
prescription drugs.  Transue v. Aesthetech Corp., 341 F.3d 911, 915, 917 (9th Cir. 2003) (“Under Washington law, 
comment k affords a blanket exemption from strict liability for design defects in medical devices or products,” but 
“should not be construed to provide protection for manufacturing defect claims”).  In California and Utah, plaintiffs 
may not pursue strict liability design defect claims for prescription drugs and devices.  Brown v. Super. Ct., 751 P.2d 
470, 477 (Cal. 1988) (“We…conclude that (1) a drug manufacturer’s liability for a defectively designed drug should 
not be measured by the standards of strict liability; (2) because of the public interest in the development, availability, 
and reasonable price of drugs, the appropriate test for determining responsibility is the test stated in comment k.”).  
Grundberg v. Upjohn Co., 813 P.2d 89, 99 (Utah 1991) (“In light of the strong public interest in the availability and 
affordability of prescription medications, the extensive regulatory system of the FDA, and the avenues of recovery 
still available to plaintiffs…we conclude that a broad grant of immunity from strict liability claims based on design 
defects should be extended to FDA-approved prescription drugs in Utah.”).  In other states still, comment k amounts 
to an affirmative defense that a prescription drug manufacturer may invoke after showing either that the product is 
“unavoidably dangerous” or that its benefits outweigh its risk.  Georgia – Bryant v. Hoffman-La Roche, Inc., 585 
S.E.2d 723, 728 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003) (“Comment k serves as an affirmative defense.”).  Nebraska – Freeman v. 
Hoffman-La Roche, Inc., 618 N.W.2d., 827, 840 (Neb. 2000) (“We conclude that § 402 A, comment k, of the 
Second Restatement should be applied on a case-by-case basis and as an affirmative defense in cases involving 
prescription drug products.”).   
88
 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, cmt. k (1965). 
13 
 
Section 6(c) of the Restatement (Third) of Torts offers even less solace to plaintiffs 
injured by pharmaceuticals.  It provides even more favorable protection to drug manufacturers by 
stating:  
A prescription drug . . . is not reasonably safe due to defective design if 
the foreseeable risks of harm posed by the drug . . . are sufficiently great in 
relation to its foreseeable therapeutic benefits that reasonable health-care 
providers, knowing of such foreseeable risks and therapeutic benefits, 
would not prescribe the drug . . . for any class of patients.
89
 
 
Comment b to section 6(c) explains that a prescription drug manufacturer will be exempted from 
strict liability on the basis of a defective design if any reasonable health care provider would 
prescribe the drug to any class of patients.
90
  Essentially, if a prescription drug confers a benefit 
upon a small class of patients, while harming other classes, it cannot be considered defectively 
designed.
91
  This reflects the judgment that as long as a drug provides a net benefit to at least one 
class of patients, it should be available on the market for a physician to prescribe.
92
   
Adding to the complexities of the design defect analysis for prescription drugs are several 
additional factors.  First, the competing views of the Restatement (Second) and (Third), as well 
as the opposing applications of comment k, illustrate the diverging view regarding judicial risk-
utility review of prescription drug designs.
93
  Additionally, the Restatements hold different views 
regarding the proper role of the FDA in reviewing prescription drug designs.  Prescription drugs 
contain inherent risks and it is under the FDA’s risk-benefit analysis in which the agency 
                                                          
89
 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS, PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 6(c) (1998).   
90
 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS, PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 6(c), cmt. b (1998).  
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 Id.  (Explaining that if a reasonable physician determines a prescription drug to have sufficient utility to warrant 
its prescription, the prescription drug is not considered defectively designed). 
93
 The Restatement (Third) takes the position that courts should not engage in the judicial review of prescription 
drug designs.  Courts following the minority interpretation of Restatement (Second) agree with the Restatement 
(Third).  E.g., Brown v. Superior Court, 751 P.2d 470, 470 (1988) (rejecting risk-utility review of prescription drug 
designs).  However, the majority interpretation of the Restatement (Second) allow courts to review prescription drug 
designs.  Toner v. Lederle Laboratories, a Div. of Am. Cyanamid Co., 112 Idaho 328, 339–40 (1987).  These courts 
apply comment k selectively, excepting from strict liability only manufacturers of those prescription drugs that 
supply an important social need.  Id.  
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determines whether the drug’s benefits outweigh its risk.94  Some courts follow the approach of 
the Third Restatement and have declined to hold manufacturers of FDA-approved prescription 
drugs strictly liable on the basis of a defective design, deferring to the FDA-approval process.
95
  
However, most courts have held that FDA approval should not prevent judicial risk-utility 
review of prescription drug designs, or prevent a finding that a prescription drug has been 
defectively designed.
96
 
Furthermore, once a prescription drug  is approved the design of the drug’s chemical 
composition cannot be changed without further FDA permission.
97
  Lastly, access to prescription 
drugs, and their use, are largely dictated by the recommendations and directions of physicians 
and other medical professionals.
98
  As a result, case law addressing design defect claims against 
drug manufacturers has not been uniformly applied and varies significantly from jurisdiction to 
jurisdiction.
99
 
Part IV: The Development of Preemption as it Applies to Prescription Drugs 
A. Introduction to Preemption 
The Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution provides that “the Laws of the United 
States shall be the supreme Law of the Land,” meaning that federal law will preempt and 
supersede conflicting state law.
100
  There are two types of federal preemption.  The first is 
express preemption.  This occurs when a federal law contains language that, by its very terms, 
preempts state law.
101
  In such cases, a court first examines the language of the federal statute 
                                                          
94
 HERRMANN, supra note 65, at 48. 
95
 Grundberg v. Upjohn Co., 813 P.2d 89,95 (Utah 1991). 
96
 E.g., Tobin v. Astra Pharm. Prod., Inc., 993 F.2d 528, 537–38 (6th Cir. 1993); Hill v. Searle Labs., 884 F.2d 1064, 
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and determines if it should be read to preempt the state law.
102
  Then, the court must interpret the 
scope of the preemption language and determine if the state law falls within the scope of the 
intended preemption.
103
  
The second kind of preemption is implied preemption.  Implied preemption occurs when 
Congress has not inserted express preemptive language in a federal law, but nonetheless, 
intended for the federal statute to preempt state law.
104
  There are three different types of implied 
preemption.  The first is conflict preemption, in which the conflict between federal and state law 
makes it impossible to comply with both laws simultaneously.
105
  When this conflict exists, 
courts will conclude that Congress intended for the federal law to supersede the state law.
106
  A 
second type of conflict preemption occurs when the state law undermines the objectives of the 
federal law.
107
  In this situation, even though it may be possible to comply with both the state and 
federal law, the court will consider whether Congress intended to preclude state law from 
creating obstacles to the accomplishment of the federal law.
108
  The court will examine the 
federal law and its legislative history to determine the purpose of the federal law, and whether 
the operation of the state law interferes with the objectives of the federal law.
109
  Finally, there is 
field preemption.
110
  This occurs when Congress enacts broad legislation that is intended to 
occupy the entire field of regulation, leaving no room for state laws on the same subject.
111
  The 
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more comprehensive the federal law is, the more likely courts will find that Congress intended 
for the federal law to preempt the state law.
112
   
The FDCA contains an express preemption clause relating to medical devices, but does 
not have a parallel provision governing pharmaceuticals.
113
  As such, courts have been forced to 
consider whether claims against drug manufacturers, especially failure-to-warn claims, are 
impliedly preempted.
114
  The Supreme Court has differentiated between cases involving brand-
name drugs and those involving their generic counterparts.
115
  The Court has held that failure-to-
warn claims involving brand-name drugs are not preempted because the manufacturer may alter 
its labeling without FDA approval pursuant to federal regulations.
116
  On the other hand, failure-
to-warn cases involving generic drugs are preempted because generic drugs are required to be 
identical, both in labeling and design, to their brand-name counterparts.
117
  
Wyeth and Mensing are the leading Supreme Court cases discussing preemption as it 
applies to the laws regulating prescription pharmaceuticals.  Admittedly, these decisions only 
addressed the preemption of failure-to-warn claims against drug manufacturers, but the reasoning 
developed in these two cases can be extrapolated to design defect claims.  There is no indication 
that a generic manufacturer’s duty of “sameness” to the brand-name drug is somehow different 
in the design context than it is in the labeling context.   
B. Failure-to-Warn Claims and Preemption 
a. Wyeth v. Levine 
                                                          
112
 Id.  
113
 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a) (2012). 
114
 See, e.g., Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555 (2009); PLIVA v. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. 2567 (2011). 
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 Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 555.  
117
 Mensing, 131 S. Ct. at 2567.  
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In Levine, the Supreme Court considered whether the FDA’s approval of a drug labeling 
preempted state law products liability claims premised on the theory that the brand-name 
manufacturer failed to adequately warn consumers about the drug’s known risks.118  
In 2000, the plaintiff, Diana Levine, sought treatment for a migraine headache, and as 
part of her treatment, she received the brand-name drug Phenergan through an IV-push 
injection.
119
  Due to an error during administration, however, the drug entered Levine’s artery, 
which ultimately led to gangrene and the amputation of her forearm.
120
  At trial, Levine claimed 
that the label was defective because it failed to warn of the specific risks associated with the IV-
push method.
121
  Wyeth countered that the FDA had approved the labeling and had rejected prior 
iterations which would have strengthened the warnings for inadvertent intra-arterial injection.
122
   
Levine brought a common law negligence and strict liability claims against Wyeth, the 
brand-name manufacturer of Phenergan.
123
  A Vermont jury found for Levine and the court 
denied Wyeth’s motion for judgment based on implied preemption. 124  The Supreme Court 
granted certiorari on the issue of whether the FDA’s approval of a brand-name manufacturers 
drug labeling preempts state law product liability claims premised on the theory that the drug’s 
labeling failed to adequately warn of serious side effects.
125
  Wyeth advanced two implied 
preemption arguments.  First, Wyeth argued that it was impossible to comply with the state law 
duty to modify Phenergan’s label without violating federal law, and second, that plaintiff’s claim 
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 Id. at 560–61. 
121
 Id. 
122
 Id.  
123
 Id.   
124
 Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 563. 
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created an obstacle to Congressional objectives by substituting a lay jury’s decision about drug 
labeling for the expert judgment of the FDA.
126
  The Court rejected both arguments.
127
 
With respect to the impossibility argument, the Court found that Wyeth could, in fact, 
have changed or strengthened its warning label pursuant to the FDA’s Changes Being Effected 
(CBE) regulations.
128
  These regulations permit a manufacturer to change its labeling without 
waiting for the FDA’s approval.129  The CBE regulations permit labeling changes, not only when 
a company acquires new safety information, but also when new analyses of previous data 
justifies a labeling change.
130
  The Court found it significant that Levine had presented evidence 
of at least twenty similar adverse events and that Wyeth “could have analyzed the accumulating 
data and added a stronger warning about IV-push administration of the drug.”131  Therefore, the 
Court held, it was possible for Wyeth to comply with both federal and state labeling 
requirements.   
Wyeth’s second preemption argument met a similar fate.  The Court found that there was 
“[p]owerful evidence that Congress did not intend FDA oversight to be the exclusive means of 
ensuring drug safety and effectiveness.”132  As the Court explained, if Congress thought state 
lawsuits would interfere with the FDA’s objectives regarding drug labeling, it would have 
inserted an express preemption clause into the FDCA with regard to brand-name 
manufacturers.
133
  The fact Congress did so for medical devices, but not for brand-name 
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prescription drugs, reinforces the conclusion that Congress did not intend to preempt failure-to-
warn lawsuits.
134
  
Furthermore, the Court declined to defer to the preamble in the FDA’s 2006 regulation 
governing the content and format of prescription drug labels.
135
  In the regulation, the FDA 
expressed its position that the approval of a drug’s labeling should preempt the state law duty to 
change the drug’s labeling.136  Yet, the Court found this language to be “inherently suspect” 
because it was not included in the proposed regulation—only the final rule—and constituted a 
dramatic change in the agency’s prior position regarding preemption.137   
Having rejected Wyeth’s two preemption arguments, the Court affirmed the verdict.  
Thus, Levine established that conflict preemption does not apply to brand-name drug 
manufacturers in state law failure-to-warn claims.
138
 
b. PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing 
In Mensing, a 5-4 majority of the Supreme Court held that state law failure-to-warn 
claims against generic pharmaceutical manufacturers are impliedly preempted by federal law.
139
  
In reaching this decision, the Court accepted the FDA’s interpretation of its own regulations that 
generic manufacturers are prohibited from unilaterally changing or strengthening their product 
labeling without prior FDA approval.
140
   
Mensing involved two consolidated cases in which the plaintiffs, Gladys Mensing and 
Julie Demahy, alleged that they developed tardive dyskinesia, an often irreversible movement 
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disorder, as a result of taking the drug metoclopramide.
141
  The plaintiffs pursued state law 
failure-to-warn claims against the generic manufacturers of metoclopramide, alleging that the 
warnings for the drug failed to adequately disclose the risks of tardive dyskinesia.
142
  The generic 
manufacturers moved to dismiss, arguing that the FDA regulations required the warnings on their 
generic drugs to be the same as those of the brand-name product and that generic manufacturers 
are precluded from unilaterally changing the labeling without FDA approval.
143
  Therefore, the 
generic manufacturers argued, the plaintiffs’ failure-to-warn claims were preempted because it 
was impossible for them to unilaterally add the plaintiffs’ proposed warnings without violating 
FDA regulations.
144
  
The two trial courts reached opposing conclusions on the generic manufacturers’ motion 
to dismiss; one court granted the dismissal while the other allowed the suit to proceed.
145
  On 
appeal, both the Fifth and Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals disagreed with the manufacturers and 
ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, finding that their claims were not preempted.
146
  The Supreme 
Court then reversed, holding that the plaintiffs’ failure-to-warn claims were in fact preempted by 
federal law.
147
  The Court explained that while brand-name manufacturers are responsible for the 
labeling on their products, the Hatch-Waxman Amendments only require generic manufacturers 
to ensure that their warnings match those of the brand-name product.
148
 
First, the Court rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that generic manufacturers were free to 
utilize the FDA’s CBE regulations, which allow manufacturers to unilaterally add or strengthen a 
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drug’s warnings before obtaining FDA approval.149  In reaching this conclusion, the Court relied 
on the FDA’s position that the CBE process was unavailable to generic manufacturers because it 
would violate the requirement that the generic products’ warnings match those of the brand-
name products.
150
  Additionally, the Court also rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that the 
defendants were free to send warnings to physicians through “Dear Doctor” letters.151  Again, the 
Court’s position was based on the FDA’s interpretation that “Dear Doctor” letters constituted 
labeling under FDA regulations, and generic manufacturers cannot unilaterally add or strengthen 
warnings without prior FDA approval.
152
 
Significantly, the majority of the Court established the proper test for impossibility 
preemption.  The Justices held that the “question for ‘impossibility’ is whether the private party 
could independently do under federal law what state law require[d] of it”153 and that courts 
should not strain to find ways to reconcile federal law with seemingly conflicting state law.
154
  
Therefore, because the generic manufacturers could not independently change their drug’s 
labeling, the Court held that it was impossible for the generic manufacturers to add the plaintiffs’ 
proposed warning without violating FDA regulations.
155
   
C. Design Defect Claims and Preemption 
Most pharmaceutical design defect claims devolve into claims asserting that either the 
FDA was wrong in approving the drug (which should either be preempted or barred by deference 
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to the FDA’s decision to approve the drug) or the manufacturer wrongfully failed to withdraw 
the drug from the market (commonly termed the “failure-to-withdraw” theory).156  Plaintiffs 
have asserted the latter theory, developed from state tort law, in an attempt to evade federal 
preemption.
157
  Practically every court to consider the issue, however, has held that failure-to-
withdraw claims are preempted because states cannot prohibit the sale and use of FDA approved 
drugs.
158
 
a. Preemption of Generic Manufacturer Claims After Mensing 
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Plaintiffs have attempted to distinguish their design defect claims from failure-to-warn 
claims, which the Supreme Court in Mensing definitively held are preempted against generic 
drug manufacturers.
159
  For example, plaintiffs have asserted that failure-to-warn claims are 
based on a duty to change the drug’s labeling (conduct that federal law prevents) while design 
defect claims are based on a duty to stop selling the drug (conduct that federal law permits).
160
  
But this is nothing more than wordplay.  Stating that a failure-to-warn claim imposes liability 
because a manufacturer failed to change its drug’s labeling is merely another way of stating that 
liability is imposed because the manufacturer sold a product with a defective label.
161
  Thus, 
plaintiffs will argue that generic manufacturers have two options to avoid liability: either change 
the drug’s labeling or stop selling the drug.162  But since the former is preempted by Mensing, 
generic manufacturers are then faced with choosing the latter option or potentially face liability.   
Likewise, under a design defect claim, in which the plaintiff asserts that the manufacturer 
sold a defectively designed product, state law offers the same two options: either change the 
drug’s design or stop selling the drug.  And because the Hatch-Waxman Amendments equally 
preclude labeling and design changes by generic drug manufacturers, state law in both cases 
seeks to impose liability for selling a product that generic manufacturers cannot lawfully 
change.
163
  As a result, the only way for generic manufacturers to avoid liability is to stop 
marketing its drug.
164
   
It is because of this interplay that the rejection of the failure-to-withdraw theory by 
Mensing cannot be limited to the failure-to-warn context.  Otherwise, plaintiffs could always 
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argue that the defendants were able to stop selling their products, and this rationale would 
prevent defendants from ever successfully asserting conflict preemption.
165
  Thus, the Supreme 
Court’s reasoning in Mensing must extend to design defect claims against generic manufacturers 
“because every products [liability] case begins with a sale,” and “[w]ithout one, there is no basis 
to sue-and no need for a preemption defense.”166  Specifically, by asserting that there was a state-
law duty not to market the drug, the claim arguably conflicts with, and is preempted by, the 
FDA’s approval of the drug for sale.167   
For this reason, the overwhelming majority of federal courts have held that the principles 
espoused in Mensing also impliedly preempt design defect claims against generic 
manufacturers.
168
  These decisions have expanded upon Mensing’s “duty of sameness,” holding 
that federal law not only requires generic and brand-name pharmaceutical products to have 
identical labeling, but they must also share the same product design.
169
  Because generic 
manufacturers cannot unilaterally change the design of their drugs without FDA approval, courts 
have held that design defect claims are also impliedly preempted under the principles established 
in Mensing.
170
   
Notably, these preempted claims include: failure-to-withdraw from the market;
171
 claims 
alleging negligent concealment of important safety information;
172
 negligent failure to test and 
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negligent failure to inspect;
173
 failure to monitor the safety of the drug and report findings to the 
FDA;
174
 fraud, negligent misrepresentation, and fraudulent concealment claims;
175
 breach of 
express warranty;
176
 and design defect claims
177
 (with the exception of Bartlett v. Mutual 
discussed infra). 
b. Design Defect Claims Come to Forefront of Preemption Debate 
The design defect claim, in particular, has assumed substantial importance since the 
Supreme Court decided to review the Bartlett decision.  In most jurisdictions, plaintiffs have 
difficulty asserting design defect claims against pharmaceutical manufacturers for two primary 
reasons.  First, many jurisdictions require plaintiffs to prove that a safer alternative design 
exists.
178
  Second, many jurisdictions have adopted comment k to the Restatement (Second) of 
Torts, section 402A, which immunizes manufacturers of “unavoidably unsafe” products where 
the product is accompanied by an adequate warning.
179
  In the vast majority of pharmaceutical 
cases, either the plaintiffs cannot prove that a safer alternative exists or the defendants can 
establish the affirmative defense that the drug was accompanied by adequate warnings. 
However, Bartlett poses neither of these issues: the court did not require proof of an 
alternative design of the drug,
180
 and the defendants abandoned their comment k defense on the 
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eve of trial.
181
  Consequently, the only remaining defense to the plaintiff’s design defect claim 
was federal preemption.  Bartlett explained, however, that unlike the state law at issue in 
Mensing, which required the generic manufacturer to change the label of the drug in question, 
nothing in New Hampshire law required Mutual Pharmaceutical to alter the drug’s design.182  
Rather, New Hampshire law required the generic manufacturer to stop selling the drug if it is 
unreasonably unsafe.
183
  The court in Bartlett explained that a state law prohibiting the sale of 
Mutual’s drug does not raise the issue of preemption because nothing in federal law affirmatively 
requires Mutual to the market its drug.
184
  The First Circuit’s analysis circumvented the issue of 
preemption, but in doing so the court created a larger problem.  The state law effectively forces 
generic manufacturers out of the market, undermining the public policy of making low cost 
generic drugs available.  The Supreme Court granted certiorari to definitively resolve the issue 
of conflict preemption as applied to the laws regulating generic drug manufacturers.
185
   
c. Bartlett v. Mutual Pharmaceutical 
In Bartlett v. Mutual, the plaintiff suffered toxic epidermal necrolysis after taking 
sulindac, a generic version of the non-steroidal anti-inflammatory drug Clinoril.
186
  Plaintiff sued 
the drug’s generic manufacturer in New Hampshire state court alleging several claims of 
action.
187
  Mutual removed the case to the U.S. District Court for the District of New Hampshire 
where the federal judge dismissed all but the design defect claim.
188
  Additionally, Mutual 
waived its comment k defense to the design defect claim, presumably in a failed effort to prevent 
the jury from becoming prejudiced by learning about the warnings and risks associated with the 
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drug.
189
  At trial, plaintiff argued that sulindac’s risks outweighed its benefits, thus making it 
unreasonably dangerous to consumers.
190
  The jury found in favor of the plaintiff and awarded 
her over $21 million dollars.
191
 
On appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, Mutual contended that 
Bartlett’s claim should have failed as a matter of law because the plaintiff did not establish a 
defect in the drug.
192
  The defendant also argued that the claim was preempted because the 
FDCA required sulindac’s design to be the “same” as the brand-name drug’s design.193  With 
respect to the requirements for a design defect claim, Mutual argued that New Hampshire law, 
which follows the Restatement (Second) of Torts section 402A, required that a plaintiff prove 
that the product was in a “defective condition,” as well as “unreasonably dangerous.”194  The 
First Circuit rejected this argument.
195
  Instead, it held that the district court properly allowed the 
plaintiff to establish that sulindac was defective solely by showing the drug was “unreasonably 
dangerous” due to its risk of causing toxic epidermal necrolysis. 196 
Next, the First Circuit dealt squarely with the generic manufacturer’s preemption 
argument.  The First Circuit stated that the Supreme Court in Wyeth adopted a “general no-
preemption rule” and concluded that Mensing’s preemption did not apply outside the failure-to-
warn context.
197
  Yet, applying Wyeth’s reasoning to a design defect claim involving a generic 
manufacturer presents several issues the court failed to resolve.  The Wyeth decision involved 
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preemption of brand-name drug manufacturers, not generic manufacturers.
198
  Accordingly, it 
would have been more appropriate for the First Circuit to apply the reasoning established in 
Mensing.  Mensing, like Bartlett, involved a claim against a generic manufacturer, and even 
though Mensing involved a failure-to-warn claim and Bartlett a design defect claim, there is no 
logical rationale to distinguish between those two claims when asserted against a generic 
manufacturer.  The Hatch-Waxman Act precludes drug manufacturers “from unilaterally altering 
either the label or design of their generic products,” thus both type of claims should be 
preempted under Mensing.
199
 
The court also failed to recognize that the statutes and regulations that govern brand-
name drugs are meaningfully different from those that govern generic drugs.
200
  As a result, the 
First Circuit was quick to state that Mensing merely carved out an exception to Wyeth’s 
presumption against preemption.
201
  But this is simply wrong because the Supreme Court in 
Mensing refused to apply such a presumption against generic drug manufacturers, the same type 
of drug manufacturers involved in Bartlett.
202
  The First Circuit even acknowledged that 
targeting the drug’s design, instead of its labeling, did not provide a conceptually coherent basis 
for distinguishing Mensing.
203
   
Nonetheless, the court was not persuaded by the defendant’s argument that preemption 
should extend to design defect claims because a generic manufacturer cannot unilaterally alter 
the composition of its drug.
204
  The court’s reasoning was quite simple―the generic 
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manufacturer could have chosen to not market the drug at all, an argument also known as the 
failure-to-withdraw from the market theory.
205
  Thus, the court held that the design defect claim 
was not preempted because, even though the generic manufacturer was precluded from changing 
the drug’s composition, the manufacturer could have decided not to market the drug.206  The 
court, however, conceded that this rationale was impossible to square with Mensing, where the 
same failure-to-withdraw argument was made and rejected by the Supreme Court.
207
  The court 
stressed that design defect claims against generic manufacturers and the possible preemption of 
such a claim is an issue of “exceptional importance” that needs a definitive answer from the 
Supreme Court.
208
   
On November 30, 2012, the Supreme Court answered the First Circuit’s calling and 
granted Mutual’s writ of certiorari.209   The Court will decide whether “federal [law] does not 
preempt state law design-defect claims targeting generic pharmaceutical products because the 
conceded conflict between such claims and the federal laws governing generic pharmaceutical 
design allegedly can be avoided if the makers of the generic pharmaceuticals simply stop making 
their products.”210  The Supreme Court should find that the failure-to-withdraw claims, and thus 
design defect claims, are preempted.  States simply cannot prohibit the marketing and sale of 
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FDA approved drugs.
211
  For this reason, as well as others to be explained below, it is likely the 
Supreme Court will reverse the First Circuit’s decision.   
Part V: Supreme Court is Poised to Reverse Mensing 
The Supreme Court is poised to adjudge whether design defect claims are preempted 
against generic manufacturers, as well as the broader question of how far the reasoning in 
Mensing extends.  Bartlett was wrongly decided for a multitude of reasons, and re-opens avenues 
of liability that the Supreme Court closed in Mensing.
212
  In Mensing, the Court was clear that 
generic drug manufacturers are required under federal law to produce drugs that are the “same 
as” their brand-name counterparts and any state law requirement that conflict with this federal 
duty of “sameness” is preempted.213   
A. Bartlett was Wrong to Minimize the Holding in Mensing  
In Bartlett, the First Circuit cited to Wyeth as authority against preemption,
214
 but that 
decision actually supports the finding of preemption for generic manufacturers.  In Wyeth, the 
Court held that failure-to-warn claims were not preempted because the CBE regulations allowed 
brand-name manufacturers to unilaterally strengthen their drugs’ labeling.215  The same, 
however, is not true for generic manufacturers.  Federal statutes and regulations that apply to 
brand-name manufacturers are meaningfully different than those that apply to generic 
manufacturers.
216
  The Hatch-Waxman Act’s “sameness” mandate expressly precludes generic 
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manufacturers from unilaterally altering either the labeling or design of their generic products.
217
  
Consequently, it was ill-founded for the court in Bartlett to find Wyeth controlling in light of the 
Supreme Court’s holding in Mensing.   
Furthermore, the dissenting justices in Mensing reiterated the limitation of Wyeth’s 
applicability to generic drug cases.
218
  They explained that: 
[A] drug consumer’s right to compensation for inadequate warnings now 
turns on the happenstance of whether her pharmacist filled her prescription 
with a brand-name drug or a generic drug.  If a consumer takes a brand-
name drug, she can sue the manufacturer for inadequate warnings under 
our opinion in Wyeth.  If, however, she takes a generic drug, as occurs 75 
percent of the time, she now has no right to sue.
219
  
 
This passage clearly expresses the distinction between Wyeth and Mensing.  For example, if the 
plaintiff took a brand-name drug, then according to Wyeth, the failure-to-warn claim is not 
preempted.
220
  If the plaintiff, however, took a generic drug, then according to both the majority 
and dissenting Justices in Mensing the plaintiff cannot sue the generic manufactures.
221
  
Accordingly, Mensing is not, as the First Circuit stated, a narrow exception to a general rule 
announced in Wyeth.   
B. Generic Manufacturers are Precluded From Changing the Design of Their Drugs  
Although the Mensing decision only addressed failure-to-warn claims,
222
 its reasoning 
applies with equal force to design defect claims.  In Mensing, the Supreme Court held that state 
law claims involving generic drugs are preempted where the plaintiff alleges that the generic 
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manufacturer should have changed aspects of its product which the manufacturer could not have 
unilaterally done without violating federal law or FDA regulations.
223
   
Given that generic manufacturers are legally bound to use the brand-name drug’s design, 
an overwhelming number of federal courts have held that state law product liability claims 
alleging the drug was defectively designed are also preempted under Mensing.
224
  The identical 
“duty of sameness” that precludes generic manufacturers from unilaterally changing its drug 
labeling also precludes generic manufacturers from unilaterally changing the design of its drugs.  
The First Circuit admitted that a generic manufacturer could not legally alter the composition of 
its drug, but still refused to find that this preempted a design defect claim.
225
  Instead, the First 
Circuit sidestepped the preemption issue by explaining that Mutual was not held liable for failing 
to change sulindac’s design, but rather, was held liable for selling an unreasonably dangerous 
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product.
226
  And since federal law does not require Mutual to market sulindac, a state law that 
prohibits generic manufacturers from selling the drug, if it is unreasonably dangerous, would not 
be preempted.  As the Comment will explain in detail below, such an assertion is fundamentally 
flawed. 
C. Preemption Cannot be Premised on a “Failure-to-Withdraw” Claim 
In Bartlett, the court held that even though a generic manufacturer is precluded from 
altering the composition of their drugs, they could have avoided liability for a defectively 
designed product by declining to sell their drugs altogether.
227
  The First Circuit asserted that 
because the FDCA did not prevent Mutual from selling sulindac, a claim arising out of the 
manufacturers failure to do so would not be preempted under Mensing.
228
  Yet this assertion, 
which even the Bartlett court conceded is fundamentally inconsistent with the reasoning in 
Mensing,
229
 has consistently been rejected by the Supreme Court and other circuits.
230
 
In their petitions to the Supreme Court, the plaintiffs in Mensing argued that their failure-
to-warn claims were not preempted because of the same “failure-to-withdraw” from the market 
theory asserted in Bartlett.
231
   The Court rejected their petition, and on remand, the Eighth 
Circuit interpreted the Supreme Court’s ruling in Mensing to encompass the plaintiffs’ failure-to-
withdraw claims and vacated the portion of its earlier opinion that embraced the theory.
232
  In 
doing so, the Eighth Circuit understood that if the Supreme Court viewed the failure-to-withdraw 
                                                          
226
 Id. 
227
 Id. at 38. 
228
 Id.  
229
 Id. (“To refuse preemption here is consistent with Wyeth but in tension not with the holding but with part of 
PLIVA’s rationale; a generic maker can avoid defective warning lawsuits as well as design defect lawsuits by not 
making the drug.”). 
230
 See Mensing v. Wyeth, Inc., 658 F.3d 867 (8th Cir. 2011); Smith v. Wyeth, Inc., 657 F.3d 420, 423 (6th Cir. 
2011) cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 2103 (U.S. 2012). 
231
 Respondents’ Petition for Rehearing, Pliva, Inc. v. Mensing, 2011 WL 2874547 1* (U.S. 2011); PLIVA, Inc. v. 
Mensing, 131 S. Ct. 2567 (2011). 
232
 See Mensing, 658 F.3d at 867. 
34 
 
from the market theory as a legitimate means to avoid conflict preemption, it would not have 
found compliance with both the state and federal law impossible.
233
  
  Likewise, the Sixth Circuit rejected the failure-to-withdraw argument.
234
  On appeal in 
Smith v. Wyeth, Inc., the plaintiffs argued that the failure-to-withdraw theory was consistent with 
Mensing because no federal law prohibited generic manufacturers from independently 
suspending the sale of their drugs.
235
  The Sixth Circuit was not persuaded, and affirmed its grant 
of summary judgment on the issue of preemption.
236
   
Courts have rejected the failure-to-withdraw argument because a “state law duty that 
would compel generic manufacturers to stop production of a drug that under federal law they 
have the authority to produce. . . would directly conflict with the federal statutory scheme in 
which Congress vested sole authority with the FDA to determine whether a drug” could be sold 
and marketed throughout the United States.
237
  Thus, a state law that would permit a jury to 
reassess the risks and benefits of an FDA approved drug cannot coexist with the FDA’s drug 
approval authority.  A failure-to-withdraw claim strikes at the very essence of the FDA’s power 
to determine what prescription drugs can be marketed in the United States.     
Similarly, every other federal appellate court to consider a design defect claim against a 
generic manufacturer has rejected the failure-to-withdraw from the market theory in light of 
Mensing.
238
  The District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana stated that the failure-to-
withdraw from the market theory is nothing more than a “cleverly dress[ed] up failure to warn 
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claim[] in a tempting but ultimately illegitimate guise.”239  The court explained that if state law 
could require a generic manufacturer to withdraw its drug from the market based on the 
unreasonable danger of the product, then it necessarily must also repudiate the labeling approved 
by the FDA.
240
  And since failure-to-warn claims against generic manufacturers are undisputedly 
preempted by Mensing,
241
 so too must the failure-to-withdraw from the market theory.   
Lastly, the failure-to-withdraw from the market theory would “render conflict pre-
emption largely meaningless because it would make most conflicts between state and federal law 
illusory.”242  A failure-to-withdraw claim could be made anytime the issue of impossibility 
preemption arises since a conflict between state and federal law would always be avoided by 
withdrawing from the regulated conduct altogether.
243
  Consequently, the Supreme Court 
recognizes that requiring drug manufacturers to withdraw their products from the market or face 
state law liability does not avoid the conflict between federal law and state tort law 
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obligations.
244
  Rather, it exacerbates that conflict by ensuring that state law requirements 
triumph over federal requirements, in direct conflict with the Supremacy Clause.   
D. Implications of the Supreme Court’s Decision 
If the Supreme Court reverses Bartlett that will greatly reduce the liability generic drug 
manufacturers may face.  After Mensing¸ all claims premised on a failure-to-warn theory were 
preempted,
245
 and if Bartlett is reversed, then design defect claims will also be preempted.  This 
will, in effect, immunize generic manufacturers from the majority of state law product liability 
claims that a plaintiff may bring.   
A system where generic manufacturers are not held accountable to consumers injured by 
their drugs is not a desirable situation.
246
  This leaves many consumers with a difficult dilemma.  
Does the consumer purchase the low cost generic drug, but then be without a remedy for 
resultant injuries, or does the consumer pay more for the brand-name drug so the manufacturer 
can be sued in the event of an injury?   
In Mensing, the Supreme Court acknowledged the “unfortunate hand” the plaintiff was 
dealt by the federal regulations when her failure-to-warn claim was preempted.
247
  But at the 
same time, the Court explained that “‘it is not this Court’s task to decide whether the statutory 
scheme established by Congress is unusual or even bizarre.’”248  Congress stuck a careful 
balance between the public and private interests in passing the Hatch-Waxman Act.  It is not the 
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role of the judiciary to second guess this judgment and recognize a state tort remedy that 
conflicts with federal law.   
Congress entrusted the FDA with regulating the national market for prescription drugs, 
and the agency grants approval only if it determines that the drug is safe and effective for its 
intended use.
249
  It would then be inconsistent with the FDCA to allow a lay jury to 
independently assess the health risks and benefits of a FDA approved drug and second guess the 
FDA’s safety determination.  Such an ad-hoc reconsideration on a state-by-state and lawsuit-by-
lawsuit basis would completely undermine the FDA’s drug approval process.250   
As the foregoing discussion demonstrates, the Supreme Court should reverse Bartlett and 
hold that design defect claims, just like failure-to-warn claims, are preempted when brought 
against generic manufacturers.  It is not the role of the courts to recognize a state tort remedy that 
conflicts with federal law, no matter how unfortunate it may be for the plaintiff.  As always, it is 
the duty of Congress and the FDA to change the laws and regulations governing prescription 
drugs if they see fit.
251
 
Conclusion 
As the number of generic drugs on the market continues to rise,
252
 issues involving 
generic drugs and preemption will continue to confront the courts.  In addressing Bartlett, the 
Court should reason that a generic manufacturer’s federal “ongoing duty of sameness” 
requirement is no different in the design context than it is in the labeling context.  This “duty of 
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sameness” is even more pertinent in the design context, as the generic product must be the same 
as the brand-name drug.     
In Mensing, the Supreme Court stressed that the Supremacy Clause should not be 
distorted “in order to create similar pre-emption across a dissimilar statutory scheme.”253  The 
converse is also true.  The Supremacy Clause may not be distorted in order to create dissimilar 
preemption across a similar statutory scheme.  Yet this is exactly what the First Circuit did in 
Bartlett.
254
  Faced with the same regulatory scheme at issue in Mensing, the First Circuit crafted 
a remedy for individuals harmed by generic drugs.
255
  In doing so, however, that court ignored 
the rationale of Mensing
256
 and ran roughshod over the statutory scheme carefully crafted by 
Congress.  The decision of the Supreme Court to review the Bartlett decision presents the perfect 
opportunity for the Court to expand Mensing’s holding to non-failure-to-warn claims, ending the 
preemption debate.   
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